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Walton: Domestic Relations: Military Retirement Pay and Equitable Divisio
DOMESTIC RELATIONS: MILITARY RETIREMENT PAY
AND EQUITABLE DIVISION IN DIVORCE
COURTS - PREEMPTION 0

McCarty "v.McCarty, 101 S. Ct. 2728 (1981)
Appellant' petitioned for dissolution of his marriage2 in the Superior Court
of California." Appellee, his wife,4 requested a portion of his military retirement pension' in the property disposition. Concluding that appellant's military
retirement rights were subject to division as community property, 6 the court
ordered appellant to pay a specified portion7 of his pension to appellee upon
retirement. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting appellant's
contention that federal legislation preempted state community property laws
permitting division of military retirement pay.8 The Supreme Court of California denied appellant's subsequent petition for hearing. 9 On appeal, 10 the
OThis case comment was awarded the George W. Milam Award as the outstanding case
comment submitted by a candidate during the fall term 1981.
1. Appellant McCarty, a colonel, had served in the United States Army for approximately
18 years at the time he filed suit. Appellant was Chief of Cardiology at a military hospital
in San Francisco. 101 S. Ct. at 2728, 2733 (1981).
2. Appellant married appellee during his second year in medical school. The couple
had been married for over 19 years at the time he petitioned for divorce. Id. at 2732-33.
3. California, a community property state, deems each spouse to own half of all assets
acquired during the marriage except for separate property owned before the marriage or
obtained through separate gift, inheritance, bequest or devise. See W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN,

§§ 66, 69 (2d ed. 1971).
4. By agreement, appellant McCarty received custody of the three minor children. In
an interrogatory appended to his subsequent brief to the United States Supreme Court,
McCarty alleged that his wife, appellee, had a prolonged affair with the fiance of the couple's
oldest daughter, who was at the time a minor. McCarty alleged the daughter witnessed the
acts and informed him of them. Brief for Appellant, Joint Appendix, at 53. In response,
appellee in her subsequent brief to the Supreme Court charged this was a violation of
Rule 34(b) of the Supreme Court of the United States, which instructs counsel to refrain
from introducing irrelevant and scandalous material in briefs to the Court. Additionally, she
stated that due to California's no-fault divorce laws, had appellant made similar allegations
in the trial court, his counsel might have been reprimanded. Brief for Appellee at 14.
5. 101 S. Ct. at 2733. Under California case law, military retirement rights were subject
to division as community property upon a divorce. E.g., In re Marriage of Milhan, 27 Cal.
3d 765, 613 P.2d 812, 166 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1930).
6. The court held the military retirement benefits divisible as community property
under California's concept of quasi-community property. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 4803 (West
Supp. 1981) (quasi-community property includes all property acquired outside California
which California recognizes as community property).
7. 101 S. Ct. at ,2733-34. The court ordered appellant to pay appellee payments equaling
one-half of the ratio of the time they were married while appellant was in the Army to the
total number of years served at the time of retirement, approximately 45%. Id. at 2734.
8. Id. at 2734.
9. Id.
10. The Supreme Court found its jurisdiction to be a proper appeal on the authority of
Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 288-89 (1921) (conflict jurisdiction
exists even where alleged violation of specific constitutional provision provides no jurisdiction).
See also 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1976) (conflict jurisdiction).
PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY,
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United States Supreme Court reversed and HELD, federal law preempts state
court division of military retirement pay pursuant to state community property

laws upon dissolution of marriage."
Under the federal preemption doctrine,12 the Supremacy Clause"s mandates
that any state law, even in an area of acknowledged state power, 14 which inter-

feres or conflicts with a federal law must yield to federal law. The Supreme
Court has applied various tests"5 to prevent state encroachment upon federal

authority. Under these tests, the Court examines relevant federal legislation
to ascertain congressional purpose and to determine whether, under the cir-

cumstances, state law impedes congressional objectives.',6 When considering
areas historically within the states' legislative domain," the Supreme Court
has sought to avoid preemption unless Congress has dearly manifested an intention to preempt state law.'8
Family law and property law have traditionally been areas reserved to the
states. 19 However, in five previous cases the United States Supreme Court has
11. 101 S. Ct. at2742-43.
12. The federal preemption doctrine was first established in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (Marshall, C. J.) (Commerce Clause preempts inconsistent state regulation
of interstate commerce).
13. U.S. CONsr. art. VI, cl. 2.
14. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 211. But see Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal

Preemption, 1972 U. IL. L.F. 515, 515. The Constitution's framers would have been
surprised at the preemption doctrine's continuing importance. THE FEDERAUSr PAPErs
discussed the Supremacy Clause only with respect to the concern that it overcome diverse
state constitutional provisions reserving to state legislatures absolute sovereignty over all
powers other than those the Articles of Confederation granted to the central government.
Id. See also WVechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 559

(1954).
15. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (identifying such tests as occupying the
field, conflicting, contrary to, repugnance, irreconcilability, difference, inconsistency, curtailment, violation, and interference).
16. Id. The ad hoc nature of preemption decisions has impeded the formulation of
useful constitutional preemption standards. Hirsch, supra note 14, at 521. But see Note,
Pre-emption as a PreferentialGround: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208,
210 (1959) (the Court might base its decisions on preemption grounds in order to avoid
considering some other constitutional question). Further, the Court in purporting to find
congressional intent to preempt might be trying to shift to Congress some of the ill will
for invalidating state law and might also be inviting congressional reconsideration of the
issue. Id. at 224-25. See also Wechsler, supra note 14, at 560 (the Supreme Court has often
had to resolve issues involving federal-state powers due to congressional difficulty in reaching

agreement on such issues).
17. For example, police, health and safety, family and property laws.
18. Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). Congressional intention to
preempt was found if the federal scheme was so pervasive that it was reasonable to infer
that Congress did not want states to supplement it, or if the federal law was in a field
where the federal interest was so dominant that state law enforcement in the same field was
assumed to be precluded, or the state policy produced a result inconsistent with the federal
objective. Id.
19. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966) (because states have a significant
interest in family-property arrangements, only if state law will clearly impair substantial
federal interests will preemption operate). Accord Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 582, 538 (1971)
(the people of Louisiana and the United States Constitution commit the power to promote
family life to the Louisiana legislature); DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956)
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held that federal law preempted community property states' family law. These
preemption cases involved specific legislative stipulations, concerning such
issues as homestead succession schedules, 20 the right to name insurance beneficiaries, 21 and savings bonds succession rights. 22 Congressional intent to preempt the conflicting state laws was clearly ascertainable from these specific
statutory stipulations.
In the most recent and pertinent family law preemption case, Hisquierdo
v. Hisquierdo,23 the Court found a California dissolution award in direct conflict
with Railroad Retirement Act (RRA) provisions. -4 Finding no conflict with
federal law, the California Supreme Court had affirmed a divorce court's
division of railroad retirement benefits. 25 The United States Supreme Court reversed and held a specific RRA prohibition 26 against any legal process, attachment, assignment or anticipation of railroad retirement benefits preempted a
state court from granting the wife an interest in RRA benefits.2 T The Court
(there is no federal family law, which is a state matter); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94
(1889) (the area of family relations belongs to state law, not federal law).
20. McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382 (1905). The Supreme Court overturned a Washington
law granting homestead rights in direct opposition to those granted by federal homestead
statutes. The federal homestead statutes set forth a specific schedule of succession rights to
the homestead. Although the federal statutes gave the interest to the entryman's widow, the
state community property law would have given the entryman's children an interest paramount to that of the widow. Id. at 387-89. Because the state laws collided with a direct
statutory expression of congressional intent, the Court found the state law to be preempted. Id. at 389.
21. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950) (5-3 decision). In Wissner, a federal statute
governing military life insurance granted an insured the right to name the beneficiary of a
policy. Id. at 658. A deceased serviceman, previously estranged from his wife, had named
his parents policy beneficiaries. Id. at 657. His widow sought the proceeds, basing her claim
on the state's community property laws which deemed the wife the owner of one-half of
the proceeds. Id. at 657-58. The Court found that Congress had clearly conveyed its intent
that state law be preempted. Id. at 660-61. In a footnote, the Court stated that its disposition
of the case made it unnecessary to decide whether states were allowed to treat military pay
as community property. Id. at 657 n.2.
22. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962). In Free the Supreme Court examined federal law
which provided a right of survivorship upon the death of either co-owner of United States
savings bonds. Under Texas law, when co-owners were husband and wife, each spouse owned
an undivided one-half interest in the bonds. Id. at 664-65. The deceased wife's son by a previous marriage claimed an interest in the bonds under the state's community property laws.
Her husband claimed sole ownership under the Treasury regulations. Id. Finding direct interference with the federal government's borrowing power, the Court held the state law was
preempted. Id. at 670. The Court stated in dictum that relief would be available in circumstances indicating fraudulent activity by the husband in his management of the general
community property. Id.
Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U..S. 306, 307-09 (1964) (indicating that relief would be available
to a person whose spouse committed fraud in managing community property funds).
23. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
24. Railroad Retirement Act (RRA) of 1974, 45 U.S.C. §§ 231a (a)(1), (b)(l)(iv), (c)(3)(i),
(d)(1)(iii)-(iv), 231d (c)(3), 231e, 231m (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
25. In re Hisquierdo, 19 Cal. 3d 613, 566 P.2d 224, 139 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1977), rev'd, 439
U.S. 572 (1979).
26. 45 U.S.C. § 231m (1976).
27. 439 U.S. at 583. The Court stipulated that it must limit review to examining whether
Congress had "positively required by direct enactment" the preemption of state family law.
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reasoned that Congress intended to enhance the railroad employee's economic
security and to encourage retirement. 28 The majority further held that, states
may not mitigate the loss of expected railroad retirement benefits by awarding
an offsetting remedy that would conflict 29 with the anti-anticipation clause."0
Subsequently, 'Congress amended the R-RA- 1 to make divorced wives, remarried widows, widows and mothers of railroad employees eligible for railroad 'annuities under the eligibility rules established for Social Security
benefits.32

The cases 33 in which federal law was found to preempt

4

state family law

See Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 US. 68, 77 (1904). Additionally the Court stated it must determine whether family law did "major damage" to "clear and substantial" federal interests
for a finding of federal preemption. 439 U.S. at 585. Accord United States v. Yaze, 382 U.S.
341,352 (1966).
28. 439 U.S. at 585. Because Congress intended to ensure that the benefits actually reach
the beneficiary, a state law dividing the benefits was preempted by the federal provision. Id.
at 584. Additionally, the Supreme Court heavily weighted the limited community property
concept embodied in the RRA. Since the RRA provided spousal benefits which were
specifically cut off upon divorce, the Court ruled that Congress intended no additional
community property treatment of RRA benefits in dissolution proceedings. Id. at 584-85.
29. Id. at 589 (an offset would impair the economic security sought by Congress).
Stressing that the Hisquierdo holding upset the balance of equality of community property
division, Professor Reppy notes that a railroad employee now may be awarded all the retirement benefits, half of the marital homestead, and half of all other community property.
Thus, the railroad employee's spouse would get substantially less than the half ownership
of all marital assets to which the spouse was previously entitled. Reppy, Learning to Live
With Hisquierdo, 6 COMm. PRO'. J. 5, 17 (1979).
30. In dissent, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, argued that there was no
conflict because the anti-attachment provision was merely designed to protect retirement
benefits from creditors. 439 U.S. at 599 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Stressing that California's
community property laws conveyed equal property rights upon husband and wife, Justice
Stewart urged that a spousal interest in retirement benefits should have been treated as a
substantive property right upon divorce. Id. at 592-93 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
31. The amendments to the Railroad Retirement Act were enacted August 13, 1981 as
part of the Budget Reconciliation Act. Pub. L. No. 97-35, 45 U.S.C. § 231c, d, e(5), f(2), g,
7
h (West 1981).
'32. Taxes paid by the railroad employee are credited to a Social Security trust fund,
then interchanged back to the Railroad Retirement Fund for direct annuities to ex-wives,
widows who meet eligibility requirements, and mothers of railroad employees. Although the
amendments are significant in view of Hisquierdo, they were not enacted in response to the
decision. Rather, efforts to enact these amendments had been made since the original RRA
was enacted in 1974. Telephone interviews with Mary Jane Yarrington, Staff Assistant to
US. Representative Oberstar (October 16, 1981).
33. See supra notes 19-23. But see Zschernig v. Miller, 389 US. 429 (1968) (involving a
non-community property state). The Supreme Court preempted Oregon's Iron Curtain
probate provisions as applied, holding they interfered with the conduct of foreign affairs entrusted by the Constitution to the President and Congress. Significantly, the Department of
Justice in its brief amicus curiae had stated that the Oregon escheat provision as applied did
-not unduly interfere with the federal conduct of foreign relations. Id. at 460. Zschernig has
been limited and distinguished. See Comment, The Demise of the "Iron Curtain" Statute, 18
VmL. L. Rxv. 49 (1972). See generally H. STiNER & D. VAGrs, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL P:RoBLEms
162-72 (2d ed. 1976).
See also United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940) (federal fiscal interests preempted
state time limitations in probate of decedents' estates); United States v. Embry, 145 Fla. 277,
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arose in community property states. Based on the fundamental principle of
spousal equality, community property law deems each spouse to own an undivided one-half interest in all marital assets.35 Because each spouse is considered to have contributed, directly or indirectly, to the wealth accumulated
during the marriage, community property jurisdictions generally treat each
spouse as a one-half owner of all community property upon divorce 6 While
the eight community property states' laws vary,3 7 all share the basic concept of
equal ownership. 3 In contrast, the common law concept of family property
109 So. 41 (1940) (federal tax claim may be filed in probate proceedings despite expiration
of time permitted by Florida non-claim statute).
34. Analyzing the first four family law preemption cases, some commentators emphasized
that they were decided before the recent increase in the divorce rate and trend towards
equitable division of marital assets. Because state interest in equitable division of marital
assets is greater today than when the decisions were rendered, this interest should have greater
weight in the Supreme Court's considerations of alleged federal-state law conflicts. Foster &
Freed, Spousal Rights in Retirement and Pension Benefits, 16 J. FAM. L. 187, 204-05 (1977-78).
These commentators question a federal policy which immunizes marital assets from distribution upon divorce, and advocate re-examination of the federal preemption doctrine. Id. at
205 n.75. Further, Foster and Freed argue there is a national interest in the efficient operation
of state alimony and marital property law due to the expense of the welfare programs. Id. at
205 n.76.
Professor Hirsch argues that rather than determining whether there is a conflict or interference, the Supreme Court should articulate the real underlying policy, a balancing of the
importance of the interference with the federal law's operation. Hirsch charges that the
Court's failure to articulate this decisional principle led it to invalidate state laws which a
reasonable application of the principle might have led it to sustain. Hirsch, supra note 14, at
537-38.
35. Other states with community property statutes are Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. Community property concepts are of ancient origin,
stemming from the Germanic Visigoths. The system was brought to America by Spanish
explorers. The concept of spousal equality evolved from spouses working side by side facing
adverse conditions. The fact that some Western states have adopted community property laws
could be partially due to similar primitive conditions in settling the early American West.
See W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 3,§§ 1-10; W. RnPy & W. DEFUNIAK, COMMUNITY
PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 1-15 (1975). See also Bartke & Zurvalec, Wisconsin, Illinois,
Ontario- Three Roads to Marital Property Reform, 12 Loy. U. LJ. 1 (1980); Irish, A
Common Law State Considers a Shift to Community Property, 5 CoMm. PROP. J.227-29 (1978).
36. See Irish, supra note 35, at 229. Separate property is not divided upon divorce. Separate property is acquired through lucrative title (succession, inheritance, and separate
donation), while community property, or financial property, is acquired through onerous
title (labor during the marriage). See W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 3, at § 1.
37. See, e.g., Eichelberger v. Fichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 401-02 (Tex. 1979) (awarding
alimony is against public policy). California applies the principle of source of income received during coverture in classifying income as community property. Income from separate
property is thus classified as separate property. In contrast, Texas classifies all income during
coverture as community income regardless of its source. See Kent, Pension Funds and Problems
Under California Community Property Laws, 2 STAN. L. REV. 447, 466 (1950).
38. Although based on the principle of spousal equality, until recently community
property states deemed the husband the sole manager of the community property in his
position as head of the household. For a critical examination of reforms in several community property states on this issue, see Bartke, Community Property Law Reform in the
United States and in Canada, 50 TUL. L. REv. 213 (1976). See also Bingaman, New Mexico's
"Community Property Act of 1973", 1 COMM. PROP. J. 213 (1974),
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treats title as the key to ownership. 9
California's spousal equality principle has extended to vested retirement
benefits flowing from federal, state or private employment. California courts
have found such benefits to be community property subject to equal division
in divorce actions.40 The Supreme Court of California in In re Marriage of
Brown-' expanded the community property concept by holding that non-vested
pension rights earned during marriage were contingent property interests, not
expectancies.42 The court reasoned that any other ruling would inequitably

divide property rights acquired through community effor

43

Thus, California

courts divided military pension rights derived from employment during

marriage as community property. 44

In another California Supreme Court case, In re Marriage of Fithian/
the court held federal law did not preempt judicial division of federal military
retirement pay in California divorce proceedings. The court examined legislative history and determined that Congress intended the military retirement
39. In common law states, earnings of each spouse and other benefits, such as gifts, have
generally been deemed owned by the recipient spouse. Therefore, the domestically oriented
spouse traditionally has had limited rights to the earnings of the other spouse upon divorce.
See Irish, supra note 35, at 227. For a discussion of the tax consequences of the community
property states' laws' concept of spousal ownership of marital assets, see generally Irish,
supra note 35. For a discussion of the tax consequences of equitable distribution states, see
generally DuCanto, The Federal Tax Treatment of Transfers of "Marital Property" Under
the New Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 59 Cmii. B. REc. 286 (1978).

40. Accord Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 492 P.2d 13, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1972); Phillipson
v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 473 P.2d 765, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1970); Benson v.
City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 355, 384 P.2d 649, 33 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1963); French v. French,
17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941); Crossan v. Crossan, 35 Cal. App. 2d 39, 94 P.2d 609 (1939).
41. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
42. 15 Cal. 3d at 841-42, 544 P.2d at 562-63, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 634-35 (overruling French
v. -French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941)). French had held that retirement pay a serviceman would receive as a Naval Reserve member was an expectancy, not community property
subject to division upon dissolution. 17 Cal. 2d at 778, 112 P.2d at 237. The French reasoning
has been criticized because it allowed a person to sue for marital dissolution just prior to
the time his or her retirement rights matured, thereby defeating any community interest of
the spouse in the benefits, even though married many years. Note, Retirement Pay: A Divorce
in Time Saved Mine, 24 HAST. L.J. 347, 353 (1973).
43. 15 Cal. 3d at 847, 544 P.2d at 566, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 638. For a thorough analysis of
Brown, see Reppy, Community and Separate Interests in Pensions and Social Security Benefits
After Marriage of Brown and ERISA, 25 U.C.LA. L. REV. 417 (1978).

44. Accord Bodenhom v. Bodenhorn, 567 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1978); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96
Idaho 672, 535 P.2d 53 (1975); Sims v. Sims, 358 So. 2d 919 (La. 1978); LeClert v. LeClert, 80
N.M. 235, 453 P.2d 755 (1969); Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976); Busby v. Busby,
457 S.V.2d 551 (Tex. 1970); Payne v. Payne, 82 Wash. 2d 573, 512 P.2d 736 (1973). Some common law states treated military retirement pensions as a factor to be considered in equitable
distribution of property. See Chisnell v. Chisnell, 82 Mich. App. 699, 267 N.W.2d 155 (1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 940 (1979); Howard v. Howard, 196 Neb. 351, 242 N.W.2d 884 (1976);
Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 464, 375 A.2d 659 (1977); Pinkowiski v. Pinkowski, 67 Wis. 2d 176,
226 N.W.2d 518 (1975). But See Fenney v. Fenney, 259 Ark. 85, 537 S.W.2d 367 (1976); Ellis
v. Ellis, 191 Colo. 17, 552 P.2d 506 (1976); Light v. Light, 599 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1980).
45. 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974) (overruled on other grounds by In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 633 (1976)).
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scheme to boost morale and to encourage prolonged military service. Congress
attempted to reach this goal, the court reasoned, by establishing a retirement
plan that promised economic security. 41 Finding no evidence of any conflict with
the military retirement pay scheme, the court concluded California courts were
not preempted from treating military retirement pensions as community
7
property in divorce actionsSubsequent to Hisquierdo, the validity of state law division of military retirement pay was challenged. In In re Marriage of Milhan,48 the California
Supreme Court distinguished Hisquierdo, finding the congressional intent to
provide a retirement incentive present in the RRA but absent in the military
retirement provisions.4 The supreme court declared military retirement pay
50

was established to encourage service members to remain in the armed services.
The court noted the RRA provisions expressly forbid legal process, attachment

or anticipation of retirement benefits, and viewed the absence of a similar
federal statute shielding military retirement provisions as significant.A
Although some jurisdictions followed the California Supreme Court's con-

clusion in Milhan52 several community property states denied division of

military retirement benefits, relying instead on Hisquierdo. The legality of
dividing military pensions was relevant to many common law jurisdictions
because over thirty states5 3 use equitable division of marital property as a
guiding principle5 4 in divorce proceedings. Decisions in these jurisdictions were
46. 10 Cal. 3d at 599, 517 P.2d at 453, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 373. Although divisibility of
military retirement pensions was an unresolved issue in 1967, the Supreme Court of California upheld a malpractice award of $100,000 against an attorney who failed to assert a
client's community interest in her husband's National Guard retirement pensions. Smith v.
Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975) (also overruled on other
grounds by Brown).
47. 10 Cal. 3d at 604, 517 P.2d at 457, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
48. 27 Cal. 3d 765, 613 P.2d 812, 166 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1980).
49. Id. at 772-73, 613 P.2d at 815, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 773, 613 P.2d at 816, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 537. Cf. Henn v. Henn, 26 Cal. 3d
323, 605 P.2d 10, 161 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1980).
52. Compare Czarnecki v. Czarnecki, 123 Ariz. 466, 600 P.2d 1098 (1979) (despite
Hisquierdo, military retirement pay subject to state community property law) with Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. 1979) (Hisquierdo forbade division of military
retirement pay as community property).
53. The 39 common law states permitting an equitable distribution of property upon
divorce, by statute or decision, are: Alabama (as to alimony only), Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia (as to alimony only), Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina (as to alimony only),
North Dakota, Ohio (as to alimony only), Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See, e.g.,
Freed 9. Foster, Divorce in the 50 States, 13 FASt. L.Q. 105, 117 (1979).
For a discussion of the factors considered in equitably dividing military retirement pay,
see generally Young, Disposition of Military Retirement Pay Upon Dissolution of a Marriage,
2 COMM. PROP. J. 239 (1975).
54. E.g., Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1204 (Fla. 1980) (a dissolution award
should be sufficient to compensate the wife for her contribution to the marriage); Painter
v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974) (all property acquired during marriage in which
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similarly disparate.:5 The split among state courts, the high national divorce
rate and the trend toward equitable division of property rights contributed to
the need for direction from the United States Supreme Court.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court found a conflict between California
law and the military retirement scheme. 6 Stressing that Congress intended the
military retirement pension to be the service member's personal entitlement,
the Court focused on two provisions. 7 First, the service member had the right

to designate a beneficiary to receive unpaid retirement arrearages upon his
death.58 Second, the service member was given an option to reduce retirement
pay and fund an annuity.5 9 Additionally, the Court noted that Congress had

recently amended the Civil Service and Foreign Service retirement schemes
allowing ex-spouses to share portions of retirement pay but had failed to amend
the military retirement provisions in a similar fashion.6 0
The Supreme Court held that the conflict sufficiently impeded congressional

objectives to warrant preemption. 61 The Court pointed to congressmen's statements made contemporaneously with the nondisability retirement provisions'
enactment, which stressed the need to induce older officers to retire. 62 The
Court declared that Congress designed the scheme to stimulate recruitment

a spouse acquires an interest may be equitably divided in a divorce action). See Letts, First
Came Canakaris, Then Came Its Progeny, 56 FLA. B.J. 669 (1981); Knight & Esser, Critical
Factors Which Influence Equitable Distribution Awards, 55 FLA. B.J. 581 (1981).
55. Compare In re Marriage of Musser, 70 Ill. App. 3d 706, 388 N.E.2d 1289 (1979) (equitable division of military retirement pension as marital property in divorce action not preempted by federal military provisions) with Russell v. Russell, 605 S.W.2d 3: (Ky. 1980) (due
to Hisquierdo, dividing military retirement pensions upon divorce would conflict with
federal statutory scheme).
56. 101 S.Ct. at 2741 (6-4 decision).
57. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1434, 2771 (1976).
58. 101 S. Ct. at 2737. Although this provision gave a service member testamentary
power over any amount owed by the government, the Court did not decide whether California may treat active duty pay as community property.
59. Id. at 2738. The Court also reasoned that in contrast to the RRA, the military retirement provisions contained no community property concepts. This omission indicated to the Court that Congress had considered community property law and intended no
community property treatment of military retirement benefits. Id. at 2737.
60. The Civil Service Amendments, Act of Sept. 15, 1978 Pub. L. No. 95-366, § l(a), 92
Stat. 600, 5 U.S.C. § 83450)(1) (Supp. HI 1979), require that ex-spouses receive Civil Service
retirement benefits pursuant to court divorce decrees. The Foreign Service amendments,
Foreign Service Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-465, § 814, 94 Stat. 2113, (to be codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 4054) grant an ex-spouse who was married to a Foreign Service officer at least ten years
a pro-rata share of a maximum of half the Foreign Service member's retirement benefits. In
addition, the ex-spouse may claim a pro-rata share of the member's widow's survivor's
annuity, and the Foreign Service member must have the ex-spouse's consent should the
member not want to provide a survivor's annuity. 101 S. Ct. at 2740.
61. 101 S. Ct. at 2741-42. See also id. at 2737-38; Goldberg, Is Armed Services Retired Pay
Really Community Property?, 48 CAL. B.J. 12, 13-14 (1973) (Congress intended that federal
military retirement pay laws preempt state law). Goldberg notes the irony of a serviceman,
never domiciled in California until the day before eligible to retire, being faced with a
divorce judgment granting his wife one-half of his retired pay. Id. But see supra note 42.
62. 101 S. Ct. at 277.
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3
and reenlistment and to ensure a youthful military for the national defense.6
The majority reasoned that a potential involuntary transfer to a community
property state, where retirement pay might be divided upon divorce, discouraged enlistment. 64 Furthermore, the Court found reduced retirement pay
for divorced service members also discouraged retirement, since current in65
come after divorce was not divisible as community property. Because division
of retirement pensions frustrated tie congressional goal of a youthful military
force, the Court held the state law was preempted. 66 A footnote added that
offsetting awards in the property disposition to compensate for lost retirement
67
pay may not be granted.
Justice Rehnquist, 6s writing for the dissent, attacked the majority's reasoning as logically inconsistent.69 He argued the majorities in Hisquierdo and the
instant case found congressional intent to preempt state laws in diametrically
opposed federal provisions7 The Hisquierdo majority found congressional
intent to preempt in the RRA, which forbade assignment of retirement pay.
The dissent emphasized, however, that federal legislation permits military
officers to assign their retirement pay.71 Further, the dissent insisted the
analytical jump required to find that all military retirement pay was outside
parts of it, arrearages and annuities,
the scope of community property because
2
were individual property was too great.7
The instant case belies the United States Supreme Court's historical reluctance to preempt state family law unless a conflict with federal law or congressional intent to preempt were clearly indicated.73 The majority departed
from family law preemption precedent. The previous cases involved specific
statutory stipulations from which congressional intent to preempt was dearly

63. Id. at 2742. See also id. at 2743 (citing Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S.Ct. 1, 3 (1981)) (the
Court affords great deference to congressional regulation of military affairs).
64. 101 S. Ct. at 2742.
65. Id. The system has generous retirement provisions and the government contributes
to the plan. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1447-55, 3991 (1976).
66. 101 S. Ct. 2741-42. The Court said that the ex-spouse adversely affected by the
instant case holding should look to Congress for alleviation. Id. at 2743.
67. Id. at 2739 n.22 (the offset prohibition was deemed required by a military provision, 37
U.S.C. § 701(c) (1976), which permitted an Army officer to assign or transfer military pay
but only when due and payable).
68. Justice Rehnquist was the only Justice with solid experience in community property
law, having practiced law in California. Kornfeld, Supreme Court Majority Shoots Down
Community Property Division of Military Retired Pay, 8 COMM. PROP. J. 187, 187 (1981).
69. 101 S. Ct. at 2746-47 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting with Brennan and Stewart, JJ., concurring) (in the instant case, the majority determined that the absence of a community
property provision in the military retirement plan suggested congressional intent to preempt;
under Hisquierdo, its absence would indicate no such congressional intent).
70. 101 S. Ct. at 2746 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 45 U.S.C. § 231m (1976); 37 U.S.C.
§ 701(a) (1976).
71. 37 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976) (under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the
Army or Air Force a commissioned officer may transfer or assign his pay account, when due
and payable). See 45 U.S.C. § 231ru (1976).
72. 101 S. Ct. at 2748 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
73. See supra note 19.
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ascertainable.74 In marked contrast, no such specific stipulation is present in
the military provisions.7
Absent any specific statutory indication of congressional intent to preempt,
the Court focused on isolated provisions of the military retirement scheme.
The provisions allowing a service member to fund an annuity and designate
a beneficiary for unpaid arrearages were secondary aspects of the retirement
scheme.70 A conflict between these two provisions and state community property
law, however, did not clearly indicate a conflict between the entire military re77
tirement scheme and state community property law.
Furthermore, the Court's interpretation of Congress' purposes in drafting
the military retirement provisions was internally inconsistent. The Court
declared the provisions' purposes were to provide an incentive for recruit8
ment and reenlistment and to encourage older service members to retired
Inducing both reenlistment and early retirement would be inconsistent.

Buttressing the Court's conclusion that Congress intended to encourage
service members to retire were statements in the 1861 Congressional Globe
79
made at the time nondisability military retirement benefits were enacted.
Although there was a need to retire incompetent or elderly officers at the time
the nondisability military retirement pay scheme was enacted, the military's
needs have changed in the past 120 years. Indeed, the contemporary military
is encountering difficulty in retaining skilled personnel.80 The California Supreme Court recognized in Fithian and Milhan that Congress intended to provide enhanced economic security and thereby to entice the service member to
remain in the military by enacting the military retirement scheme.
The Court's ban on offsetting remedies to compensate for lost benefits
undercuts state laws which deem spouses to own these benefits. Because this
position undermines community property's underlying concept of spousal
equality, the instant case will have a disturbing impact on divorce courts.sr
74. See supra notes 20-35 and accompanying text.
75. 101 S. Ct. at .2744-46.
76. Id. at 2747. The heart of the retirement system was its generous provisions and the
fact that the government contributes to the plan. Id. at 2731-32.
77. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. A better decision might have held the
annuity and unpaid arrearages provisions to be untreatable as community property but left
the retirement pay in general treatable by state divorce courts.
78. 101 SCt. at 2742.
79. Id. at 2731.
80. Less than two percent of the armed services as a whole have college degrees. There
is discussion of extending the present twenty-year minimum length of service to thirty years
to qualify for retirement in order to meet the present demand for specially skilled service
members. Kornfeld, supra note 68, at 191. See also Gross, The Drive to Revive the Draft, 229
NATION 353, 361-62 (1979) (quoting Binkin, Youth or Experience? Manning the Military,
BRooma-us INsT. REP (1979)) (the military still follows the wasteful and inadequate practice

of recruiting young people who lack the needed skills, despite its need for more technicians
and craftsmen).

81. For example, because service members frequently relocate, their spouses are unable to obtain permanent employment to qualify for a personal pension. This mobility
also encourages military families to rent rather than buy housing. Consequently, military
retirement pensions are ofteh the family's only significant asset. Brief for Amici Curiae on
Behalf of Certain Members of Congress and Organizations at 50, 52-53. By denying the ex-
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With over thirty common-law states using equitable division of marital assets
as a guideline in dissolution proceedings,8 2 military spouses will be adversely
affected even in non-community property states. The offset prohibition, buried
in a footnote, 3 might induce courts to disguise an offset through increased
alimony or child support. Such a disguised offset would produce inequitable
inconsistencies. For instance, the availability of alimony as a disguised
84
compensatory offset would vary with each jurisdiction's alimony policy.

Similarly, child support might not be available because there were no children
of the marriage or the children had reached their majority." Therefore, the
divorce court's ability to undercut the prohibition will be limited by state
laws and the facts of each case.
Recent amendments to the RRA grant annuity rights to ex-spouses and
widows. 86 This suggests that the Supreme Court in Hisquierdo misinterpreted
the RRA's anti-assignment, anti-anticipation clause in finding congressional
intent to preempt. The absence of a similar clause in the military retirement
scheme, and the recent RRA amendments, render the Court's reasoning in
the instant case suspect.8 7 Congress has also recently amended the Foreign
Service and Civil Service provisions to permit spousal sharing of retirement
benefits. 88 Congress should similarly amend the military retirement provisions.
The inequitable situation s1 that would result from courts surreptitiously offspouse any portion of the retirement pensions, the instant case significantly reduces the
ability of divorce courts to award the ex-spouse an equitable property settlement.
82. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
83. 101 S. Ct. at 2729 n.22.
84. For instance, Texas grants no alimony. See supra note 57. See Rheinstein, Division
of Marital Property, 12 WILLAairIE. L.J. 413, 425-26 (1976). Thus, the military spouse under
Texas divorce law would not receive any disguised offset, while military spouses in other
states might be awarded more equitable settlements in disguised offsets to avoid the impact
of the instant case. See Reppy, supra note 29, at 21 (federal common law preempts the
Texas anti-alimony authority to fill the gap created by the similar Hisquierdo offset prohibition). But see Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 401-02 (Tex. 1979) (court
relied on Hisquierdo's prohibition against offsets as compensation to deny railroad spouse a
40%o interest in husband's railroad retirement benefits and awarded no alimony due to the
public policy against alimony).
85. A finding of fraud may supply an alternative basis for compensation. See supra note
22. Cf. Ihey v. Ibey, 93 N.H. 434, 43 A.2d 157 (1945) (widow entitled to constructive trust
in compensation for amount lost in spouse's savings bonds fraud), aff'd on rehearing,94 N.H.
425, 55 A.2d 872 (1947); W. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE 227-28 (1960) (discussing Ibey). For a discussion of the unpredictability of the exercise of judicial discretion in
divorce actions, see Rheinstein, supra note 88, at 851-33.
86. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
87. The unsavory allegations appended to appellant McCarty's brief may have subtly
influenced the majority. See supra note 4. Furthermore, the instant case may reflect common
law judges' typical hostility toward community property law. See, e.g., Bartke, Yours, Mine
and Ours-Separate Title and Community Funds, 44 WAsH. L. REv. 379, 581 (1969) (quoting Willcox v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 357 Pa. 581, 586-87, 55 A.2d 521, 524 (1947)) (community property law represents a concept of property that is entirely alien and foreign to
that of the common law as to the conjugal relationship and the marital rights in property).
88. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
89. A Florida court distinguished the instant case in a subsequent dissolution opinion,
Cullen v. Cullen, No. ZZ-355, slip op, (FI,. 1st D.C.A. March 22, 1982). The court ordered
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setting awards calls for renewed congressional attention.9 0
KATHERINE MACDONALD WALTON

a retired Air Force colonel to pay his wife permanent periodic alimony in the amount of
one half his military nondisability retirement pay. Reasoning that community property and
alimony awards are based on different legal foundations, the court ruled that the instant case
only held community property division of military retirement pay to be preempted. Because
alimony is a support obligation imposed by law separately from spousal property rights,
the court held the instant case inapplicable to alimony support awards. Id. at 4-8. See also
Higgins v. Higgins, 408 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1982) (court may consider military retirement pension an asset of a spouse when determining the amount of a permanent periodic
alimony award because alimony is a support obligation based on spousal needs). But see
supra note 84 and accompanying text (the Cullen and Higgins reasoning could not be used
to compensate the spouse denied a portion of military retirement pay in Texas, where
alimony is not granted).
90. In response to the instant case, bills that would permit divorce courts to award proportional shares of service members' military retirement pensions to their spouses were
introduced in Congress. S. 888, S. 1453, S. 1648, S. 1772, S. 1814, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981);
H.R. 3039, H.R. 4902, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). A strong military lobby opposed the bills.
In response, ex-wives of servicemen joined Action for Former Military Wives, a national
organization formed to lobby for congressional legislation guaranteeing them a share of their
husbands' military benefits. Orlando Sentinel Star, Oct. 18, 1981, at IF, col. 1.
Subsequent to the instant case, the United States Supreme Court further expanded its
protective policy towards the military service member's benefits in Ridgway v. Ridgway, 102
S. Ct. 49 (1981). Ridgway involved a deceased serviceman who had changed his Servicemen's
Group Life Insurance Act of 1965 policy to name his second wife the beneficiary immediately after remarrying. Although the serviceman had been legally obligated to maintain
the policy on behalf of his children pursuant to a divorce decree, the Supreme Court upheld
the beneficiary change. Noting that the military insurance scheme provided an insured
service member the right to freely designate and change a beneficiary, the Court held
the military provisions preempted the state divorce, decree. Id. at 55-57.
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